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The  present  paper  is structured  around  two  main  constructions,  fixed  points  of  functors  and  fibrations  and 
sections  of  functors.  Fixed  points  of  functors  are  utilized  to  resolve  problems  of  infinite  regress  that  have 
recently  appeared  in economics.  Fibrations  and  sections  are  utilized  to  model  solution  concepts  abstractly,  so 
that  we  can  solve  equations  whose  arguments  are  solution  concepts.  Most  of  the  objects  (games,  solution 
concepts)  that  we  consider  can  be  obtained  as  some  kind  of  limit  of  their  finite  subobjects.  Some  of  the 
constructions  preserve  computability.  The  paper  relies  heavily  on  recent  work  on  the  semantics  of  program- 
ming  languages. 
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1.  Introduction 
Recent  work  in game  theory  and  in applied  areas  such  as industrial  organization 
has  considered  problems  that  involve  infinite  regress.  Some  authors,  such  as 
Mertens  and  Zamir  (1985) and  Lipman  (1991), have  resolved  the  infinite  regress  ‘by 
hand’,  i.e.  by  working  hard  to  exploit  the  special  features  of  their  models.  The 
message  of  the  present  paper  is  that  such  resolutions  of  infinite  regress  can  be 
thought  of  as proofs  of  existence  of  fixed  points  of  certain  ‘maps’  (called  functors) 
defined  on  certain  ‘spaces’  (called  categories).  This  change  of  perspective  is useful 
in several  respects.  First,  there  is a general  theory  of  existence,  uniqueness,  stability 
and  continuity  of  such  fixed  points  that  can  be  invoked  to  check  whether  a 
particular  infinite  regress  problem  can be resolved  or not.  The  theory  was developed 
by  computer  scientists;  Section  2  of  the  present  paper  provides  an  exposition. 
Secondly,  having  a general  theory  allows  us to  see the  already  existing  examples  of 
resolutions  of  infinite  regress  as  cases  of  a  single  construction.  Thirdly,  we  can 
resolve  infinite  regress  in cases that  had been  considered  intractable  up to now,  such 
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as  the  regress  reported  in  Crawford  (1985,  p.  825)  as  intractable  and  resolved  in 
Vassilakis  (1990).  Fourthly,  we  can  investigate  whether  each  particular  regress  can 
be  resolved  effectively. 
In  the  present  paper  I have  tried  to  summarize  my  earlier  results,  to  motivate  the 
constructions  with  economic  examples,  and  to  give  a  reasonably  complete  picture 
of  the  mathematical  fundamentals,  with  some  emphasis  on  the  effectiveness  of  the 
main  constructions,  omitting  most  proofs  but  providing  detailed  references  to  the 
sources  where  proofs  can  be  found.  I  have  also  included  new  results  and  open 
problems  to  indicate  the  direction  this  project  is  taking. 
To  motivate  the  introduction  of  the  new  mathematical  tools,  we  begin  with  a  bit 
of  history.  The  economist’s  workhorse  is  the  competitive  model  of  exchange;  it 
assumes  that  economic  agents  determine  their  demands  and  supplies  by  maximizing 
their  objective  functions  taking  prices  as  given;  that  there  is a price  quoted  for  each 
commodity;  and  that  all  trade  takes  place  at  prices  that  simultaneously  clear  all 
markets.  Why  should  agents  take  prices  as  given?  Who  sets  prices?  How  do  prices 
reflect  the  actions  of  agents  in  all  markets?  These  questions  (Kreps,  1990,  p.  4) have 
motivated  the  introduction  of  game  theory  into  economics.  The  environment  in 
which  individuals  have  to  make  decisions  is  modelled  as  a  game  g.  A  prediction  on 
g is a subset  of  the  set  of  all  possible  outcomes  in  g.  A  rule  that  assigns  a prediction 
to  each  game  g  is  called  a  solution  concept.  An  outcome  predicted  by  a  solution 
concept  is  an  equilibrium  of  g.  Equilibria  might  fail  to  exist,  be  unique  or  be 
efficient.  In  some  games,  lack  of  existence,  uniqueness  or  efficiency  is  just  an 
artifact  of  the  formalism,  but  in  other  games  it  has  been  argued  that  ‘institutions 
will  evolve’  to  restore,  to  some  extent,  these  properties  of  equilibria.  The  examples 
that  follow  illustrate  the  meaning  of  this  argument  and  show  that  its  consistent 
application  generates  an  infinite  regress. 
The  first  example  shows  how  lack  of  existence  provides  incentives  for  institution 
formation.  Shepsle  (1986)  considers  a  game  g = (N, X, u),  where  each  player  i E N 
has  preferences  over  a  set  of  alternatives  X  described  by  a  utility  function 
ui:  X-+  R.  The  solution  concept  is  ‘majority  voting’:  an  alternative  y  in  X  is  an 
equilibrium  if  there  is  no  alternative  x  preferred  to  y  by  a  strict  majority  of  the 
players.  Shepsle  denotes  by  W(y)  the  set  of  alternatives  preferred  to  y  by  a  strict 
majority  of  the  players,  and  describes  the  ‘paradox  of  voting’  as  follows: 
*  For  almost  all  utility  functions  and  for  all  alternatives  y  in  X,  W(y)  is  not  empty 
(equilibria  do  not  exist). 
l  Vor  almost  all  utility  functions  and  for  any  two  alternatives  x,y  there  is  a  finite 
sequence  Z,,  .  .  .  ,  Z,  of  alternatives  such  that 
(i)  a  strict  majority  prefers  Z,  to  x: 
Z1 E W(x); 
(ii)  a  strict  majority  prefers  Zi  to  Z;_i 
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(iii)  a  strict  majority  prefers  y  to  Z, 
In  other  words,  the  nonexistence  problem  is  particularly  severe:  an  agenda-setter, 
namely  an  individual  who  can  dictate  the  kind  and  order  of  alternatives  players  vote 
on,  can  induce  any  alternative  y  as the  final  outcome  of  majority  voting.  This  result 
provides  strong  support  for  the  position  that  ‘institutions  matter’,  where  by  institu- 
tions  we mean  the  rules  that  govern  the  process  of  voting.  A  striking  example  is cited 
by  Shepsle  (1986,  p.  56):  while  it  takes  one  line  to  describe  majority  rule,  the  rules 
that  govern  the  process  of  voting  in  the  U.S.  House  of  Representatives  take  600 
pages  to  describe.  Riker  (1980,  p. 443)  states  that  I...  the  particular  structure  of  an 
institution  is  at  least  as  likely  to  be  predictive  of  socially  enforced  values  as  are  the 
preferences  of  the  citizen  body’.  Given  that  the  particular  structure  of  institutions 
is important  to  players,  and  given  that  institutions  are  just  rules  under  players’  con- 
trol,  players  will  try  to  change  institutions  to  advance  their  own  interests.  This  is 
clearly  seen  by  Riker  (1980,  p.  445): 
One  can  expect  that  losers  on  a  series  of  decisions  under  a  particular  set  of  rules  will  attempt  (often 
successfully)  to  change  institutions  and  hence  the  kind  of  decisions  produced  under  them.  In  that  sense 
rules  or  institutions  are  just  more  alternatives  in  the  policy  space  and  the  status  quo  of  one  set  of  rules 
can  be  supplanted  with  another  set  of  rules. 
In  other  words,  players  will  try  to  influence  the  outcome  of  game  g  by  choosing 
strategies  in  a  larger  game  F(g):  the  strategies  of  F(g)  are  (proposed)  rules  of 
behavior  in  g.  But  now,  the  outcome  of  game  F(g)  is  at  stake,  and  players  will  try 
to  influence  it  by  proposing  rules  of  behavior  in  F(g),  i.e.  by  choosing  strategies  in 
F*(g).  To  capture  all  the  opportunities  of  the  players  to  propose  rules,  we  must  be 
able  to  show  that  the  infinite  regress  g,F(g),F*(g),  . . .  can  be  resolved,  i.e.  that  F 
has  a  fixed  point. 
Lack  of  uniqueness  of  equilibria  in  a game  g also  provides  incentives  for  ‘institu- 
tions  to  evolve’.  For  example,  if  g  is  a  ‘split-the-dollar’  bargaining  game  with  two 
players  who  announce  simultaneously  their  claims  on  the  dollar,  then  any  division 
of  the  dollar  is  a  (Nash)  equilibrium.  The  multiplicity  creates  a  coordination  prob- 
lem;  if  one  player  expects  the  (l/2,  l/2)  equilibrium  to  prevail,  he  plays  l/2;  if  the 
other  player  expects  the  (l/3,  213)  equilibrium  to  prevail,  she  plays  2/3.  But  then 
(l/2,  2/3)  is  not  an  equilibrium  and  both  players  get  their  disagreement  payoff 
(zero).  Hence,  there  is an  incentive  for  each  player  to  propose  a particular  institution 
(for  example,  a variant  of  Rubinstein’s  bargaining  game)  that,  to  the  extent  it  is ac- 
cepted,  will  select  an  equilibrium  and  resolve  the  coordination  problem.  To  capture 
the  ability  of  players  to  make  such  proposals,  we  construct  a  larger  game  F(g)  in 
which  these  proposals  are  points  in  players’  strategy  spaces.  Given  that  the  choice 
of  institution  matters  (Kreps,  1990,  ch.  15),  players  will  try  to  influence  the  choice 
of  strategies  in  F(g)  by  proposing  institutions  in  F*(g),  etc.  Hence  the  need  to 
resolve  infinite  regress.  I  should  emphasize  at  this  point  that  Crawford  (1985, 176  S.  Vassilakis  /  Economic applications of  Scott domains 
p.  825),  and  no  doubt  others,  saw  this  problem  but  considered  the  infinite  regress 
intractable. 
Lack  of  efficiency  of  an  equilibrium  in  a  game  g  will  also  provide  incentives  for 
institution  formation.  For  example,  the  Cournot  equilibrium  in  an  oligopoly  game 
is  inefficient  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  players  (firms),  and  each  firm  has  some 
incentive  to  propose  an  institution  that  facilitates  collusion.  Another  example,  cited 
by  Ordeshook  (1980),  is  a  prisoner’s  dilemma  type  game  that  has  a  unique  ineffi- 
cient  equilibrium,  and  so  provides  incentives  for  players  to  propose  institutions  (in 
this  case,  government)  that  break  the  dilemma.  As  in  the  previous  cases,  the  pro- 
posed  institutions  will  be  points  in  the  strategy  spaces  of  a  larger  game  F(g),  and 
the  by  now  familiar  argument  will  generate  an  infinite  regress. 
I  will  now  sketch  informally  the  construction  that  resolves  the  infinite  regress.  I 
start  with  a  game  g  and  a  ‘map’  F  that  takes  games  into  games,  and  I  construct  a 
game  X(g)  that  satisfies  two  properties: 
(a)  X(g)  is  a  fixed  point  of  F. 
(b)  Each  F’(g),  t=O,  1,2,  . . . , is  a  ‘subgame’  of  X(g). 
X(g)  is then  the  universal  game  generated  by  g,  and  captures  all  the  opportunities 
available  to  the  players  in  the  environment  described  by  g. 
The  game  g = (A,  U)  will  be  a  normal  form,  complete  information  game,  where 
A  = (Ai,Az)  is  a pair  of  strategy  spaces  and  u = (u,,  u2)  a  pair  of  payoff  functions. 
Generalizations  to  n-player  and/or  incomplete  information  games  are  immediate 
once  the  constructions  are  understood  in  this  simple  case.  Each  Ai  is  a  complete 
partial  order  (cpo),  namely  a  poset  with  the  following  properties: 
l Ai  contains  a  least  element  I  ; 
l  if  x,<x2<...  is an  increasing  sequence  in  Ai,  then  the  least  upper  bound  UE  1 xi 
of  the  sequence  belongs  to  Ai. 
Each  payoff  function  Ui : A 1 X A2  +  R  is  a  Scott-continuous  function,  i.e.  it 
preserves  least  upper  bounds  of  increasing  sequences: 
Uj  ii,Xi  =iglU,(Xi)9  ifxl<x2<...,  (  > 
where  Xi E A 1 x A2  and  A I x A2  is  ordered  componentwise. 
The  meaning  of  the  order  relation  on  each  Ai  will  become  clear  once  we  see  how 
to  transform  any  game  (B,  u)  into  a  game  (A,  u)  with  the  required  properties.  One 
way  would  be  to  define 
. 
. 
A;=BiU{  J-3,  where  I  $Bi; 
Q;<CZ,!  iff  Ui=  I  or  a;=al; 
ui(a)  = 
-03,  if  Ui=  I,  some  i, 
ui(a)9  otherwise. 
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least  restrictive  one  that  has  I  as its least  element.  The  payoff  functions  are  then 
defined  to  agree  with  ui on  B,  x B,  and  to  ensure  that  J_ is never  played.  Another 
way  would  be  to  define 
l Ai = all  closed  subsets  of  Bi; 
l  ai~a,’  iff  at/ is a  subset  of  ai; 
l  ui = the  unique  extension  of  ui that  is continuous  with  respect  to  the  Hausforff 
topology  on  Ai. 
One  could  also  define  Ai  as  a  subfamily  of  the  closed  sets  of  Bi.  In  all  cases  the 
elements  of  Ai are  properties  of  strategies  and  the  order  relation  is a precision,  or 
information-content,  relation:  ai<<a! means  that  GJi  is a  less precise  property  than 
aI.  The  least  element  is  the  totally  non-informative  property.  Scott  continuity 
means  that  the  utility  of  a  property  of  strategies  equals  the  least  upper  bound  of 
utilities  of  properties  that  approximate  it.  How  restrictive  is Scott  continuity?  This 
depends  on  the  order  on Ai.  Under  the  first  definition  of  < , Scott  continuity  is SO 
weak  it is almost  vacuous.  Under  the  second  definition,  though,  it is quite  strong. 
Intermediate  degrees  of  strength  can  be  achieved  if  one  restricts  the  subsets  of  Bi 
that  can  be  compared  by  the  order  relation. 
The  fact  that  we call the  functions  that  preserve  least  upper  bounds  of  increasing 
sequences  Scott-continuous  suggests  there  is a  topology  on  each  Ai such  that  the 
continuous  functions  with respect  to this topology  are precisely  the Scott-continuous 
functions.  The  open  sets  U of  this  topology  are  defined  by  two  properties: 
0  U is an  upper  set:  XE 0;  x<y  implies  y E U. 
l  U  is inaccessible  by  least  upper  bounds  of  increasing  sequences:  if  x1 <x2 < . . . 
and  UT=, XiE  U,  then,  for  some  i,  XiE  U. 
For  example,  if  Ai=  [0,  11, then  the  Scott  open  sets  are  the  open  half-says  (t, 11, 
o<t<1. 
The  crucial  step  in the  construction  is the  definition  of  the  map  F that  assigns to 
each  game g the  game  Fg whose  strategy  spaces  include  the  institutions  that  players 
can  propose  to  coordinate  actions  in g.  By  the  revelation  principle  (Kreps,  1990, 
Ch.  18)  institutions  can  be  modelled,  without  loss  of  generality,  as  direct 
mechanisms  on  g. 
A  (direct)  mechanism  on  g is a probability  measure  p  on  the  aggregate  strategy 
space  A,  xA,  of  g;p(E)  is the  probability  that  mechanism  p  will  recommend  to 
players  an  action  in E c A,  XII,.  Let  d(A,  xA,)  be the  set of  all Bore1 probability 
measures  on  A,  xA,  with  respect  to  the  Scott  topology;  it  can  be  ordered  as 
follows:  p<q  iff  p(U)  <q(U)  for  all Scott-opens  U.  With  this  order,  d(A,  xA,)  is 
a cpo;  its least  element  is the  measure  that  assigns  probability  1 to  the least  element 
(I,  I  ) of Al xAZ..  The  space  d&4,  xAZ)  is interpreted  as the  set of  all institutions 
that  each  agent  can  choose  from  to  coordinate  his  actions  in g. 
Given  that  all  agents  can  propose  a  mechanism,  each  agent  i  will  receive  two 
recommended  actions,  i.e.  a point  in A?.  The  response  of  i to  these  recommenda- 
tions  is determined  by  a  Scott-continuous  function  6i : A;  -+/Ii,  that  is chosen  by 
agent  i. For  example,  if  agent  1 chooses  to  obey  the  recommendations  of  agent  2, 178  S.  Vassilakis  /  Economic  applications of Scott domains 
then  1 chooses  a function  6, : A:  -+ Al  defined  by  6t(at,  CZ;)  = CZ;  for  all (at, a;).  The 
fact  that  agents  can  choose  such  functions  is the  formal  expression  of  the  fact  that 
agents  do  not  have  to  obey  recommendations  unless  it is in their  interest  to  do  so. 
The  space  [A: --f  Ai]  of  Scott-continuous  functions,  when  ordered  pointwise,  is a 
cpo. 
We  can  now  define  F(g)  as  a game  (B, 0);  its  strategy  spaces  are  given  by 
9  B;=d(A,  xA,)x  [A+A;]. 
In other  words,  in F(g)  each  agent  i chooses  the  mechanism  pi E d(A,  x A,)  he pro- 
poses  and  the  ‘deviation  function’  6;~  [A:  +Ai]  that  he uses to  respond  to  recom- 
mendations.  What  happens  if  each  agent  i  chooses  a  particular  strategy  (piSi)? 
Agent  j  will receive  recommendations  from  agent  i with  probability  law pij,  namely 
the  marginal  of  pi  on  Aj.  Hence,  agent  j  will  receive  a  pair  of  recommendations 
with  probability  law P,j XP2j.  He  is going  to  respond  to these  recommendations  ac- 
cording  to  his  deviation  function  Sj.  The  probability,  therefore,  that  agent  j  will 
take  an  action  in  a  set  E c Aj  equals 
We  can  interpret  the  measure  qj = (Pij XP,)  0 SJT’ as j’s  induced  mixed  strategy 
on  Aj,  and  the  measure  q = q1 x  q2  as  the  probability  distribution  on  A 1 x A2  in- 
duced  by  (pi, Si),  i = 1,2.  Hence,  define 
.  Vi(P1,  61,P2T ‘2)= 
s 
ui dq* 
The  definition  of  F(g)  is now  complete. 
We  can  embed  g into  F(g)  by  a  pair  of  Scott-continuous  function,  CZi  : Ai -  Bi, 
defined  by  ai(  (I  9  ii),  where  I  is  the  bottom  element  of  A(A,  x  A,)  and 
cii  : A:  +  Ai  is defined  by  cii(bt, b2) =Ui 9 for  all  bt, b2 in Ai.  It  is easy  to  see that 
i.e.  that  Ui  is an extension  of  Ui. In the  same  way,  we can  embed  F’(g)  into  F’+‘(g) 
for  all  t>O.  Denoting  F’(g)=(A(t),  u(t)>,  we  get  a  nested  sequence  of  strategy 
spaces 
A(l)+A(2)dA(3)+... 
and  a sequence  of  payoff  functions  such  that  Ui(~+ 1) extends  Ui(t),  for  all i and  t 
(see  Fig.  1). 
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A ,(O)  +  A  (1)  c  A  (2)  -  ” 
Fig.  2.  No  junk  requirement. 
To  capture  all the opportunities  open  to the players,  we want  to construct  a game 
X(g)  = (K  w> that  is a ‘limit’ of  these  sequences  and  a fixed  point  of F.  To  see how 
r; should  be  defined,  recall  that  every  strategy  in Ai  has  to  be  a strategy  in  x, 
otherwise  I$ under-represents  the  opportunities  open  to  the  players.  It  is tempting 
to define  q  as the  union  U,“=  1 A,(t);  recall,  though,  that  each Ai  is embedded  in- 
to Ai(t+  l),  and  that  this  implies  that  this  union  contains  many  different  names  for 
the  same  strategy.  We  want  all  these  different  names  of  the  same  strategy  to  be 
embedded  in  q  as a  single  strategy.  Hence  the 
No  junk  requirement.  For  each  i = 1,2 and  t = 0,  1,2,  . . .  there  is a Scott-continuous 
embedding  A,(t)  : A,(t)  --f q  such  that  Fig. 2 commutes. 
A cpo  q  that  satisfies  the  no  junk  requirement  might  be  too  large,  i.e.  contain 
strategies  not  available  to  the  agents  in the  environment  described  by  g.  To  make 
x  the  smallest  cpo  that  satisfies  no  junk  we impose  the 
No  exaggeration  requirement.  If  there  is  another  cpo  q’  and  Scott-continuous 
embeddings  A:(t)  : Ai  -+ q’  that  also  satisfy  no junk,  then  there  is a unique  Scott- 
continuous  embedding  f:  q-t  5’  such  that  Fig. 3 commutes. 
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Fig.  4.  Payoff  function  of  the  universal  game. 
It  turns  out  that  our  assumptions  are  exactly  right  to  guarantee  that  such  yi exists 
and  is unique  up  to  isomorphism.  We  write 
Y = colimit  Ai( 
t 
TO construct  the  payoff  functions  Wi  :  q  x  Y2 --*R,  we  use the  no  exaggeration  re- 
quirement  and  the  fact  that  each  ui(t+  1) extends  ui(t).  It  then  follows  that  there 
is a  unique  Scott-continuous  function  Wi  such  that  Fig. 4 commutes. 
This  completes  the  construction  of  the  universal  game  X(g).  We write  concisely 
X(g)  = colimit  F’(g). 
It  turns  out  that  the  map  F  preserves  colimits  of  chains,  i.e.  F(col- 
imit,  gl) =colimit,  F(g,).  The  universal  game  X(g),  then,  is  a  fixed  point  of  F, 
because 
F(X(g))  = F(colimit  F’(g))  = colimit  F’+‘(g)  = colimit  F’(g)  =X(g). 
We  now  come  to  the  ‘computability’  of  universal  games.  Clearly,  the  fact  that 
strategy  spaces  are  not  necessarily  subsets  of  the  natural  numbers  means  that  to 
define  ‘computable’  strategy  spaces  we must  find  a way to  extend  the  definitions  of 
recursive  function  theory  to  cpos.  At  the  very  least,  then,  the  cpos  we single  out  as 
‘computable’  must  have  a countable  basis,  and  this basis must  be computable  in the 
usual  sense. 
How  exactly  should  we define  a basis  of  a cpo?  We first  look  at an example.  Let 
D  be  the  set  of  all  subsets  of  N,  ordered  by  set  inclusion,  and  let  E  be  the  set  of 
all finite  subsets  of N similarly  ordered.  Clearly,  E is countable  while D is not.  Each 
X in D can  be obtained  as the least  upper  bound  (union)  of  elements  of  E contained 
in X: 
(a)  X=U{YeE:  YGX}. 
Furthermore,  the  set  of  elements  of  E  below  X  is  directed,  in  the  sense  that  if 
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(b)  { YEE:  Y<X}  is directed. 
Finally,  the  basis  E  itself  consists  of  elements  with  a  ‘compactness’  property 
(c)  If  YEE  and  if  Y<Uui,,Xi:  where  {Xi:  ill}  is a directed  set,  then  there  is 
some  i in Z such  that  Y,<Xi. 
We  can  now  abstract  these  three  properties  to  define  the  basis  of  compact 
elements  of  a  cpo.  An  element  x  of  a  cpo  D  is compact  if  it  satisfies 
(c)  if  x<Udi,  (di)  directed,  then  x<dj  for  some  i. 
Let K(D)  be the  set of  compact  elements  of  D,  and  let  1 d = {XC  D  : x<d}.  We say 
K(D)  is a  basis  of  D  if  for  all  d  in  D: 
(b)  K(D)  f7 ld  is directed,  and 
(a)  d=U(K(D)n  Id). 
Note  that  not  every  cpo  will satisfy  these  properties:  for  example,  the  real interval 
[O,  l]  will not.  Those  cpos  that  do  satisfy  them  are  called  algebraic. 
The  first  computability  requirement  we impose  is very  natural:  K(D)  has  to  be 
countable,  and  the  order  relation  restricted  to  K(D)  has  to  be  decidable,  i.e.  a 
Turing  machine  must  be able to decide  whether  or not two  basis elements  are related 
by  the  order  relation.  Hence 
Condition  A.  There  is  a  surjection  d:  N-t  K(D)  such  that  the  set  {(m, n) EN’  : 
d,,, <d,,}  is effectively  decidable. 
The  second  computability  requirement  is also  a  natural  consequence  of  the  ap- 
proximation  properties  a and  b;  given  that  we approximate  each  element  of  D  by 
directed  subsets  of  its basis  K(D),  we want  to  be able  to  decide  effectively  whether 
a  finite  subset  F  of  K(D)  ‘approximates’  K(D).  To  formalize  this,  we  say  that  a 
subset  F  of  K(D)  is a normal  substructure  if  for  each  x  in K(D),  the  set Ft7  lx  is 
directed.  The  computability  requirement  is 
Condition  B.  For  any  finite  subset  T of  N,  it is decidable  whether  {  df : t E T  }  is a 
normal  substructure  of  K(D). 
We define  an effective  presented  domain  as a pair  (0,  d)  with  properties  A and  B. 
If  (E, e)  are  effectively  presented  domains,  and  if f:  D -+ E  is Scott-continuous  we 
say  that 
Condition  C.  f  is computable  if for  each  n in N  the  set  {(n, m) EN*  : e,,, <f(d,,)}  is 
recursively  enumerable. 
Note  that  Scott-continuity  off  and  Conditions  A and  B imply  that  knowledge  of 
the  values  off  on  the  basis  elements  d,, suffices  to  determine  the  value  off  on  all 
elements  of  D.  Hence,  roughly  speaking,  the  meaning  of  Conditions  A,  B and  C 
is that  a domain  D  contains  both  ‘computable’  and  ‘noncomputable’  elements,  but 
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the  value  of  a  computable  function  on  a  computable  element  d,  can  be  effectively 
approximated  by  computable  elements  in  its  range,  while  the  values  of  such  a  func- 
tion  on  noncomputable  elements  are  limits  of  its  values  on  computable  ones. 
Recall  that,  unless  our  notion  of  computability  is  preserved  by  the  map  F,  X(g) 
will  not  be  a  ‘computable’  game  even  if  g  is.  If  D  is  effectively  presentable,  d(D) 
and  [D +D]  are  not  necessarily  so,  and  unfortunately,  F  is  a  composite  of  d,  --t 
and  x.  Can  we  build  on  Conditions  A  and  B  to  find  the  right  notion?  We  will  be 
guided  by  the  fact  that  the  definition  of  a  computable  cpo  has  to  include  the  real 
interval  I=  [O, 11, for  otherwise  n(D)  will  not  be  computable  even  if  D  is.  For  each 
TV TI,  let  Z(t)  be  the  smallest  integer  larger  than  t. 
Define  f,, :  I+  I  by 
fnW= 
Z(lO”f-  1) 
1o”  . 
The  f,,‘s  are  Scott-continuous  and  satisfy: 
(i)  fr  <f2  <  . . . . 
(ii)  f,(Z)  is  a  finite  set,  for  all  n. 
(iii)  t = U,“= 1  f,(t),  for  all  t e  [O, 11. 
Note  that  U,“=,  f,(Z)  behaves  very  much  like  a  countable  basis  of  I.  If  a  cpo  D  ad- 
mits  a  sequence  of  Scott-continuous  functions  f,, :  D -+ D  that  satisfy  properties  (i), 
(ii)  and  (iii),  it  is  called  a  finitely  continuous  cpo.  Abusing  notation  let 
K(D)  = U,“=,  f,(D).  If  this  K(D)  satisfies  Conditions  A  and  B,  D  is  a  computable 
finitely  continuous  cpo.  It  turns  out  that  this  notion  of  computability  is  preserved 
byA,  4,  x  and  by  the  operation  of  taking  colimits.  Hence,  each  strategy  space  K 
is  a  computable  finitely  continuous  cpo  if  each  Ai  is.  More  information  can  be 
found  in  Kanda  (1979),  Kamimura  and  Tang  (1984,  1986),  Graham  (1988)  and 
Gunter  and  Scott  (1989).  A  more  recent  approach  to  computability  on  cpos  is 
developed,  under  the  name  of  modest  sets,  in  Barr  and  Wells  (1990,  p.  333),  Rosolini 
(1990),  and  Freyd  et al.  (1990).  As  of  this  writing,  I do  not  know  whether  the  payoff 
functions  of  each  F’(g)  are  computable,  because  their  definition  involves  in- 
tegration. 
2.  Categorical  preliminaries 
The  ‘map’  F is defined  on  all  games  g;  the  collection  of  all  games  is  not  a  set  but 
a  proper  class.  Hence  the  need  to  consider  categories. 
Definition  1.  A  category  X  consists  of 
(i)  a  class  of  objects  = A;B;...  ; 
(ii)  for  any  two  objects  A,B,  a  set  of  morphisms  from  A  to  B:  a  typical  mor- 
phism  is  denoted  by  f  : A  -+ B; 
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g: B-+  C,  then  there  is a morphism  &:A  +  C;  for  any  three  morphisms  f, g, h for 
which  composition  is defined,  (gf)h  =g(fh); 
(iv)  for  each  object  A,  an  identity  morphism 
id,:  A +A  that  satisfies 
fid,  =f 
id,g=g 
for  any f  and  g for  which  the  compositions  are  defined  (see  Table  1). 
In all cases,  the  definitions  of  composition  and  identity  are  the  obvious  ones;  some 
standard  references  are  MacLane  (1971),  Arbib  and  Manes  (19754, or  Adamek  et 
al.  (1990). 
Maps  between  categories  that  preserve  composition  and  identities  are  called 
functors. 
Definition  2.  A function  F from  category  Xto  category  Y F:  X+  Y, assigns to each 
object  A in X an object  F(A)  in  Y, and to each morphism  F: A  --) B in X a morphism 
F(f)  : F(A)  -+ F(B))  in  E  in  addition, 
FW)  = F(g)F(f),  F(id,)  = id,,,  . 
Examples  of  functors. 
The  forgetful  functor  U: Top  +  Set  assigns  to  each  topological  space  (A, r)  its 
underlying  set A  (where  T is the  topology  on A),  and  to  each  continuous  function 
f  the  function  f  itself. 
The  powerset  functor  P:  Set -+ Set assigns to  each  set A its powerset  P(A)  and  to 
each  function  f:  A  -+  B  the  ‘direct  image’  function  P(f)  : P(A)  -+ P(B)  defined  by 
P(f)(E)  =f  (-9,  E c A. 
Table  1 
Examples  of  categories 







Any  set  A 
Any  poset  A 
all  sets 
all  topological  spaces 
all  compact  Hausdorff  spaces 
all  partially  ordered  sets 
all  natural  numbers 
all  natural  numbers 
elements  of  A 
Elements  of  A 
all  functions 
all  continuous  functions 
all  continuous  functions 
all  monotonic  functions 
m-m  iff  n75n 
m-n  iff  mzn 
a-b  iff  a=b 
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The  probability  functor  d  : Comp  Haus  --) Comp  Haus  assigns  to  each  compact 
Hausdorff  space  A the  set of  all Bore1 regular  probability  measures  d(A)  equipped 
with the weak-star  topology,  and to  each  continuous  function  f:  A -+ B the  function 
A(f):d(A)-+d(B)  defined  by  A(f)(P)(E)=P(f-l(E)),  PEA(A),  E  Bore1  subset 
of  B. 
Functors  can  be composed  in the  obvious  way.  Morphisms  between  functors  are 
called  natural  transformations. 
Definition  3.  Let  F, G : X+  Y be  functors  from  X to  Y. A natural  transformation 
A : F-t  G from  F to  G is a collection  of  Y-morphisms  (,12,  : F(A)  +  G(A)),  EX such 
that  if f  :A  -+ B  is a  morphism  in X,  G(f)A,  =n,F(f),  i.e.  Fig. 5 commutes. 
Examples  of  natural  transformations. 
The  sample  mean:  Let  S c R  be the  set  of  all possible  outcomes  of  some  experi- 
ment;  let  zero  be  in  S.  Define  the  functors  F, G : co  +  Set  as  follows: 
F(n)  = S”;  F(n+n+l)=f,, 
G(n)=R;  G(n+n+l)=g,, 
where  f,,:Sn+Sni’  is defined  by f,(x)  =(x,  0),  and  g,  : R -+ R  by 
The  sample  mean 
Then,  J. : F+  G is a natural  transformation.  In  general,  a natural  transformation  A 
can  be  thought  of  as  a  rule  for  transforming  elements  of  F(A)  into  elements  of 
G(A):  the  commutativity  conditions  imply  that  this  rule  is the  same  for  all A  in the 
category  X;  in the  example,  the  rule  for  forming  the  sample  mean  is the  same  for 
all  sample  sizes. 
We can  now  formulate  the  conditions  under  which  a functor  F has  a fixed  point 
A 
A 
A  WA)  *  G(A) 
B  F(B) 
h 
-  G(B) 
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L =F(L)  such  that  all  the  iterations  F’(A),  t>O,  are  faithfully  embedded  in  L 
(recall  points  (a) and  (b) on p.  176). These  are  essentially  continuity  conditions,  i.e. 
we  require  that  F  preserves  some  sort  of  ‘limit’. 
Definition  4.  f:  A  --) B is an isomorphism  in the  category  X if there  exists g : B--t  A 
in X  such  that  gf=idA,  fg=idg. 
Definition  5.  L  is a fixed  point  of  the  functor  F:  X+  X  if there  is an isomorphism 
f:F(L)+L.  We  write  L=F(L). 
Definition  6.  The  constant  functor  at A,K,  : X-t  X,  is defined  by 
&(B)  =A,  KA(f)=idA. 
We  can  now  formulate  exactly  the  notion  of  ‘limit’  that  we need. 
Definition  7.  Let  T:  J-t  X  be a functor.  A colimit  of  T is an  object  L  of  X  and  a 
natural  transformation  1:  T+K,  such  that  if  2’:  T+Kc  is  any  other  natural 
transformation  from  T to a functor  constant  at any other  object  L’, there  is a unique 
X-morphism  f:  L +L’  such  that  Fig. 6 commutes  for  all  objects  j  in  J. 
We interpret  the  naturality  of  A as  ‘consistent’  embedding  of  each  T(j)  into  L, 
i.e.  embedding  according  to  some  rule.  The  defining  property  of  L  means  that  L 
is the  smallest  object  in X  into  which  each  T(j)  is consistently  embedded. 
Examples  of  colimits. 
If  J  is a set,  i.e.  the  only  morphisms  are  the  identity  morphisms  and  T:  J-+  Set, 
then  the  colimit  L  of  T is the  disjoint  union  of  the  T(j)‘s: 
L  =  u  (T(j)  x  (A) 
jeJ 
and  3Lj:  T(j)-+L  is defined  by  Aj(X)=(x,j),  ~EJ,  XE  T(j). 
If  J=  o  and  X  is a poset,  the  colimit  L  of  T:  J-t  X  is the  least  upper  bound  of 
the  sequence  T(j). 
h 
I 
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If  J=  o  and  X  is one  of  Set,  Top,  Comphaus,  then  the  colimit  of  T: J+  X  is the 
‘inductive  or  direct  limit’  of  the  T(j)‘s;  its  explicit  construction  is  described  in 
Adamek  et  al.  (1990,  p.  187).  An  economic  application  is  in  Aliprantis  et  al.  (1984, 
pp.  239-240). 
Theorem  1.  Colimits  are unique  up  to  isomorphism  (Adamek  et  al.,  1990,  p.  187, 
Proposition  11.29). 
Definition  8.  Let  T: J+X  be  a  functor  with  colimit  (L,lz).  The  functor  F:X-+  Y 
preserves  the  colimit  of  T if  (F(L),  F(A))  is  a  colimit  of  the  composite  functor  FT. 
We  write  F(colimit  T) = colimit  (FT). 
Definition  9.  The  functor  F: X+  Y  is  J-continuous  if  it  preserves  colimits  of  all 
functors  T: J-X. 
Examples  of  continuous  and  discontinuous  functors. 
The  forgetful  functor  U:  Top  -+ Set  preserves  all  colimits. 
The  powerset  functor  P : Set  +  Set  does  not  preserve  any  colimits. 
Constant  and  identity  functors  preserve  all  colimits. 
See  Adamek  et  al.  (1990,  p.  207);  more  interesting  examples  will  be  provided  in 
the  next  section.  To  formulate  the  fixed  point  theorem,  we  need  the  concept  of  the 
functor  of  iterations  of  a  functor  F. 
Definition  10.  Let  F: X-t  X  be  a  functor,  and  f:  A  -+ F(A)  a  morphism  in  X.  The 
functor  of  iterations  of  F  with  respect  to  f  is  qf: o  -+  X,  defined  by  qf(n)  = F”(A), 
qf(n  + n + 1) = F”(f). 
Theorem  2.  Let  F: X+X  be a functor  such  that 
(a)  There  is a morphism  f:  A  + F(A)  for  some  A  in X. 
(b)  The colimit  of  the functor  of  iterations  of  F  w.r. t. f  exists  (call it (L, A)) and 
is preserved  by  F. 
Then,  L  is a fixed  point  of  F. 
For  a  proof  see  Adamek  and  Koubek  (1979,  p.  106),  Smyth  and  Plotkin  (1982, 
p.  765),  or  Manes  and  Arbib  (1986,  p. 270).  If  X  is  a  poset,  Theorem  2  reduces  to 
the  Kleene  fixed  point  theorem,  while  if Xis  a complete  lattice,  it reduces  to  Tarski’s 
fixed  point  theorem.  Note  that  the  theorem  provides  both  an  existence  result  and 
a  construction  of  the  fixed  point  as  a  colimit;  the  theorem  holds,  in  particular,  for 
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3.  Which  category? 
3.1.  Motivation 
The  categories  we are  going  to  consider  will  have  partially  ordered  sets  as  objects; 
hence,  the  games  we  can  handle  in  the  theory  must  have  strategy  spaces  that  are 
posets.  The  next  paragraph  shows  that  this  is  without  loss  of  generality. 
Let  g = (A, U) be  an  (ordinary)  game,  where  A  = (A,  . . . A,)  is  an  n-tuple  of  com- 
pact  Hausdorff  spaces  and  u = (ul  . . . u,)  an  n-tuple  of  continuous  real-valued 
payoff  functions  defined  on  the  product  fl  (A)  of  the  strategy  spaces.  Note  that 
there  is no  order  whatsoever  on  each  Ai.  Take  T(Ai)  to  be  the  set  of  closed  subsets 
of  Ai  ordered  by  inverse  set  inclusion:  if X  and  Y are  two  closed  subsets  of  Ai,  then 
X<  Y means  that  Y c X,  i.e.  that  X  and  Y are  consistent  properties  of  the  strategies 
in  Ai  and  Y refines  X,  or  X  approximates  Y, or,  finally,  Y implies  X.  Furthermore, 
the  map  f:  Ai-tT(Ai),  fx=  {x},  x  in  Ai,  embeds  Ai  into  T(Ai).  The  next  two 
theorems  describe  some  properties  of  this  embedding. 
Theorem  3.  If  S  is compact  Hausdorff,  then  so  is T(S)  in  the  Vietoris  topology; 
furthermore,  the  ‘inclusion’  map f  is continuous. 
Proof.  Gierz  (1980,  pp.  284-285). 
Theorem  4.  If  S is compact  Hausdorff  and g : S +  R  is continuous,  then  there  is a 
continuous  extension  g : T(S)  -+ R  of  g. 
Proof.  This  is  a  consequence  of  Tietze’s  extension  theorem  (Kuratowski,  1968, 
Theorem  I’,  p.  161 and  Theorem  4,  p.  191).  If  S is a set  of  alternatives  and  g a utility 
function  on  S,  its  extension  g  is  a  utility  function  on  properties  of  the  alternatives 
in  S;  the  fact  that  g extends  g means  that  the  ranking  of  alternatives  does  not  change 
when  they  are  embedded  into  T(S)  as  singleton  sets. 
Theorem  5.  Each  ordinary  game  can  be faithfully  embedded  into  a game  whose 
strategy  spaces  are posets. 
Proof.  If  g = (A, U) let  g’=  (B, U) be  defined  by  Bi = T(Ai),  while  Ui : n(B)  -+  R  is  a 
continuous  extension  of  Ui. 
It  should  be  emphasized  that  the  interpretation  of  the  partial  order  on  the  strategy 
spaces,  namely  a  precision  ordering,  is  entirely  different  from  the  interpretation  of 
orders  in  games  with  strategic  complementarities,  studied  by  Milgrom  and  Roberts 
(1989);  in  particular  a precision  ordering  can  be  defined  on  all  games,  whether  there 
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3.2.  Complete  partial  orders 
In  this  subsection  the  category  that  fits  our  needs  is defined,  not  in  one  scoop  but 
by  successive  approximations.  To  motivate  complete  partial  orders,  recall  that  if  S 
is  compact  Hausdorff,  A  = T(S)  is  ordered  by  inverse  set  inclusion.  If  Xi  a X2 >  . . . 
is  a  nested  sequence  of  closed  sets  in  S,  their  least  upper  bound  nF=,  Xi  is  also 
closed  in  S:  a  sequence  of  ‘finer  and  finer’  properties  in  A  has  a  minimal  common 
refinement  in  A.  Furthermore,  A  contains  S  itself,  the  least  informative  property 
in  A. 
Definition  11.  A  poset  A  is  a  cpo  if 
(a)  every  increasing  sequence  xl  C x2 C  . . . in  A  has  a least  upper  bound  U  Xi in  A. 
(b)  A  has  a  least  element  I. 
If  x,y  are  in  A  and  xc y, we  say  that  y  refines  x,  or  that  y  implies  x,  or  that  x 
approximates  y. 
Examples  of  cpos. 
If  S  is  compact  Hausdorff,  T(S)  is  a  cpo;  if  D  is  any  subset  of  T(S),  then 
uo=n{X:XED}. 
Compact  real  intervals  and  the  extended  real  line  R*=  [-CO, CO]  with  the  usual 
ordering  are  cpos;  they  are  still  cpos  if  the  usual  ordering  is  inverted. 
Open  real  intervals  are  not  cpos. 
We  now  define  a topology  on  cpos  induced  by  the  order;  then  we  define,  and  in- 
terpret,  continuous  functions  in  this  topology. 
Definition  12.  A  subset  U  of  a  cpo  A  is  Scott-open  if 
(a)  U  is  an  upper  set:  if  x  is  a  property  in  U  and  y  refines  x,  xc  y,  then  y  is  also 
in  U. 
(b)  U  is  inaccessible  by  increasing  sequences:  if  (xi>  is  an  increasing  sequence 
and  its  least  upper  bound  IJx;  belongs  to  U,  then  some  element  xi  of  the  sequence 
belongs  to  U. 
In  other  words,  (a)  means  that  U is a collection  of  properties  closed  under  refine- 
ment  and  (b)  says  that  if  U contains  the  least  common  refinement  of  a  sequence  of 
‘finer  and  finer’  properties,  it  also  contains  one  of  these  properties. 
Examples  of  Scott-open  sets. 
A  subset  U of  the  real  interval  [a, b] is Scott-open  iff  it  is of  the  form  (x, 61, where 
--03 <a,  b < 00. A  subset  U of  [a, b]” is  Scott-open  if  it  is  an  upper  set  open  in  the 
ordinary  metric  topology.  If  X  is  compact  Hausdorff  and  V is  open  in  X,  N(V)  = 
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These  examples  are  on  p. 100 of  Gierz  (1980). 
Theorem  6.  The  collection  of  all Scott-open  sets  in a cpo  A  is a topology. 
Proof.  Gierz  (1980,  p.  100). 
Definition  13.  A  function  f:  A  + B  between  cpos  is Scott-continuous  if  it  is con- 
tinuous  in the  Scott  topologies  of  A  and  B. 
The  next  theorem  characterizes  Scott-continuous  functions. 
Theorem  7.  A function  f  : A -+  B is Scott-continuous  if and  only  if it preserves  least 
upper  bounds  of  increasing  sequences:  f (U Xi) = U f  (Xi). 
To  see what  this means,  think  off  as a scientific  theory  (or  a computer  program) 
that  transforms  input  data  in A  into  output  data  in B.  Let Tot(A)  be the  set of  total 
(maximal)  elements  of  A.  To  fix ideas,  let Tot(A)  c R:  be  a compact  set  of  initial 
endowment  vectors  and  Tot(B)  be  the  price  simplex  in  R’;  f  is  a  theory,  say 
Arrow-Debreu,  which,  given  the  preferences,  assigns to  each  endowment  vector  in 
Tot(A)  a  price  vector  in  Tot(B).  In  practice,  we can  never  be  sure  that  we  have 
observed  exactly  the  values  of  the inputs  and  the  outputs  of  the  theory.  This  means 
that,  to  have  a testable  theory,  we must  extend  f  to  a function  from  A  to  B,  i.e.  a 
function  that  predicts  a property  of  prices  for  each  property  of  endowments.  The 
theory  is reliable  only  if, when  fed better  and better  approximations  to the true  value 
of initial  endowments,  it produces  better  and better  approximations  to the true  value 
of  prices:  if  x1 Cx,  C . . .  and  Uxn=x,  then  f(xl)cf(x2)c  . . .  and  Uf(x,,)=f(x). 
This  interpretation  of continuity  is due to Scott  (1970) for  programs  and  to  Laymon 
(1987)  for  scientific  theories. 
Definition  14.  cpo  is  a  category  with  objects  all  cpos  and  morphisms  all  Scott- 
continuous  functions. 
Definition  15.  cpo”  is a category  with  objects  all n-tuples  (A,,  . . . , A,)  of  cpos  and 
morphisms  all  n-tuples  of  Scott-continuous  functions. 
Definition  16.  If A, B are cpos,  then  [A + B] is the set of Scott-continuous  functions 
from  A  to B,  ordered  pointwise:  f  c g iff f (x) C g(x)  for  all x in A.  The product  A  x B 
is ordered  by  (x, y) C_  (x’, y’)  if x C_  x’  and  y C_  y’. 
Theorem  8.  If  A, B  are cpos,  then  so  are A  x B  and  [A -+  B]. 
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To  apply  the  fixed-point  theorem  2,  we  define  the  ‘map’  --f  (which  assigns  to  any 
two  cpos  A, B their  function  space  [A +  B]),  on  morphisms  as  well,  in  such  a  way 
that  it  becomes  an  w-continuous  functor.  This  is  not  possible  on  cpos  (see  Manes 
and  Arbib,  1986,  p.  307),  but  it  can  be  done  in  a  subcategory  of  cpos  obtained  by 
restricting  the  morphisms  to  be  embeddings. 
Definition  17.  Let  A,B  be  cpos.  A  Scott-continuous  mapf:  A  -+ B is an  embedding 
if  there  is  a  monotonic  map  g : B + A  (its  adjoint)  such  that 
g(f(x))=x,  XE-4, 
f(W))  <Y,  Y E B. 
(See  Fig.  7.) 
Theorem  9. 
(a)  Each  Scott-continuous  f  has  at  most  one  adjoint. 
(b)  If f has an adjoint  g,  then f is injective,  g is surjective  and  Scott-continuous, 
and  both  f  and  g preserve  least  elements. 
(c)  If f  is an  isomorphism,  its  adjoint  is its  inverse. 
(d)  The  composition  of  two  embeddings  is an  embedding. 
Proof.  Manes  and  Arbib  (1986,  p.  308). 
Given  this  theorem,  we  denote  the  adjoint  off  by f  *: (f, f  *) is  sometimes  called 
an  embedding-projection  pair.  To  interpret  the  meaning  of  such  a  pair,  let  A  again 
be  a set  of  properties  of  initial  endowment  vectors  and  B a set  of  properties  of  price 
vectors,  and  interpret  f  as  a theory  that  predicts  a property  of  price  vectors  for  each 
property  of  initial  endowments.  The  fact  that  f  is injective  means  that  two  different 
properties  of  initial  endowments  will  generate  two  different  predictions  about 
prices;  the  fact  that  f  preserves  least  elements  means  that  if  there  is  no  information 
about  initial  endowments  the  theory  will  provide  no  information  about  prices.  The 
adjoint  f  * is  the  ‘best  possible’  inverse  of  theory  f:  given  a  property  of  prices,  f  * 
predicts  the  property  of  initial  endowments  that  could  have  generated  it.  If  this 
@operty  y  of  prices  is  in  the  range  of  the  theory  f,  say  y =f  (x),  f  *  will  correctly 
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predict  the property  of initial  endowments  x that  generated  f(x)  : f  *(f(x))  =x.  And 
if a property  of  prices y is not  in the  range  of  theoryf,  f*(r)  is a property  of  initial 
endowments  that  approximately  generates  y,  in the  sense that  if theoryfis  fed  data 
f*(y),  it  will generate  a  prediction  f(f*(~))  that  approximates  y : f(f*(y))  c y. 
Definition  18.  The  category  cpoE has  the  same  objects  as cpo,  but  its  morphisms 
are  restricted  to  be  embeddings. 
We  can  now  investigate  what  kind  of  construction  can  be  done  in  cpo,. 
Definition  19.  An  o  colimit  in the  category  X is the  colimit  of  a functor  T: o  -+X 
(see Table  1 for  0). 
Theorem  10.  Cpo  and  cpo,  have  all w-colimits.  If  T: w --t cpoE,  the  co/knit  (L, A) 
of  Tin  cpoE is also a colimit  in cpo.  (L, A) is a colimit  of  T iff  the natural  transfor- 
mation  A : T--f K,  satisfies: 
(a)  r~j~~  : j E o}  is an  increasing  sequence  in  [L + L]; 
(b)  U AjAT  = id,. 
Proof.  Smyth  and Plotkin  (1982, p. 768, Theorem  2, p. 773, Example  2, and p. 775, 
the  discussion  above  Fact  1.a);  or  Gierz  (1980,  ch. 4.3). 
Theorem  11.  Cpo  and  cpoE all have small  products,  i.e. products  defined  on a set. 
Proof.  Smyth  and  Plotkin  (1982,  p. 774)  or  Manes  and  Arbib  (1986,  p. 297  and 
p. 311). 
Definition  20.  The  product  functor  fl  : cpog-t  cpo,  assigns  to  each  n-tuple 
A =(Ar,&  . ..) A,)  its  product  n  (A),  and  to  each  n-tuple  f:  A  -+ B  its  product 
JI (f)  : II  (A)  --* II  (B),  defined  by  II  (f)(a)  = (f,(a,),  . . . ,f,(a,)). 
Theorem  12.  fl  preserves  all wcolimits. 
Proof.  MacLane  (1971,  p. 115 and  p. 69 (products)). 
Definition  21.  The  function  space  functor  -+ : cpoE X CpoE  -+ cpo,  is  defined  as 
follows: 
On objects:  + (A, B) = [A -+  B] = all Scott-continuous  maps  from  A to B (not  onfy 
embeddings). 
On  morphisms:  if f:  A  --)  A’  and  g : B -+  B’  are  two  embeddings,  then  +  (A g) : 
[A + B] + [A’-+ B’]  is an  embedding  defined  by  --t (A g)(h) = ghf * (see Fig. 8). 
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h 
A  ;-B 
-_t  (f&(h) 
Fig.  8.  The  function-space  functor  on  morphisms. 
Proof.  Manes  and  Arbib  (1986,  pp.  311-317);  Gierz  (1980,  ch.  4.3);  Gunter  (1989, 
p.  84,  Theorem  6.5). 
3.3.  Finitely  continuous  complete  partial  orders 
The  category  cpo,  would  be  adequate  for  the  construction  of  universal  games  if 
it were  not  for  the  fact  that  the  Lawson  topology  on  a cpo  is not  necessarily  compact 
Hausdorff  (Section  4).  This  topology  is  fine  enough  (has  so  many  open  sets)  that 
requiring  payoff  functions  to  be  continuous  with  respect  to  it  is not  more  restrictive 
than  the  continuity  conditions  imposed  as  a  matter  of  course  in  economics  (Section 
4).  Unless  the  Lawson  topology  is compact,  though,  solutions  to  optimization  prob- 
lems  involving  Lawson  continuous  functions  will  not  always  exist.  We  could  restrict 
ourselves  to  the  category  of  continuous  lattices  studied  in  Gierz  (1980),  but  this 
category  is  not  closed  under  the  probability  functor:  see  the  example  on  p. 225  of 
Graham  (1988).  Nonetheless,  by  imposing  a  restriction  on  cpos  we  can  generate  a 
category  that  satisfies  the  following  properties: 
(a)  it  is closed  under  all  functors  involved  in  the  construction  of  universal  games; 
(b)  its  objects  are  compact  Hausdorff  in  the  Lawson  topology; 
(c)  it  has  all  o  colimits; 
(d)  the  functors  in  (a)  preserve  all  such  colimits. 
Definition  22.  A  cpo  A  is finitely  continuous  if  there  is  a  sequence  <fi>  of  Scott- 
continuous  functions  fi  : A  --f A  that  satisfies 
(a)  fiQ2r...; 
(b)  the  range  of  each  A  is  finite,  for  all  i; 
(c)  Ufi=idA. 
Examples. 
Compact  real  intervals  are  finitely  continuous  cpos;  see  Graham  (1988,  p. 222, 
Lemma  2.3). 
If  S  is  a  separable  compact  Hausdorff  space,  T(S)  is  a  finitely  continuous  cpo; 
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Definition  23.  The  category fcpo  has  all finitely  continuous  cpos  as objects  and  all 
Scott-continuous  functions  as morphisms;  fcpoE  has  the  same  objects  but  its mor- 
phisms  are  embeddings. 
Theorem  14.  FcpoE  has finite  products,  and  o  colimits.  Hence,  if  T: o  --f  fcpoE  is 
a functor,  the natural  transformation  A : T-t  KL is a colimit  of  Tiff  conditions  (a) 
and  (b)  of  Theorem  10 are satisfied  and  L. is finitely  continuous. 
Proof.  This  follows  from  the  existence  of  o  colimits  in cpo,  and  the  definition  of 
a  finitely  continuous  cpo;  see Graham  (1988,  p. 221). 
Definition  24.  If A is a finitely  continuous  cpo,  /l(A)  is the  set of  Bore1 probability 
measures  on  A  with  respect  to  the  Scott  topology. 
Definition  25.  The  stochastic  dominance  order  on  d(A)  is  defined  by  p c q  iff 
p(U)  <q(U)  for  all  Scott-open  sets  U. 
Example. 
If A = [O,  11, then  each  Scott-open  U is of  the  form  (a, 11; hence  the  name  of  the 
order  on  d(A). 
Theorem  15.  Zf A  is a finitely  continuous  cpo,  then  so is A(A)  with  the stochastic 
dominance  order. 
Proof.  Graham  (1988,  p. 224,  Theorem  2.4). 
Definition  26.  The probability  functor  A : fcpoa  -+ fcpo,  is defined  on objects  as in 
Definition  24  and  on  morphisms  f:  A  --f B  as  follows:  A(f)  : A(A)  + A(B), 
A(f)(p)(E)  =p(f-l(E)),  PEA(A),  with  E  a  Bore1  subset  of  B. 
Theorem  17.  A  preserves  all w  colimits. 
Proof.  Vassilakis  (1990,  Appendix  2); see also  the  related  Lemmas  3.1  and  3.2 on 
p. 228 of  Graham  (1988). 
Theorem  18.  The product  (see Definition  20) andfunction  space (see Definition  21) 
functors  map  into  fcpoE  when  restricted  on fcpoE. 
Proof.  Lawson  (1989,  p. 150). 
Theorem  19.  The  product  and  function  space  functors  on  fcpoE  preserve  o 
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Proof.  They  do  so  in  cpo,,  and  fcpoE  is closed  under  cc)  colimits. 
3.4.  The  Lawson  topology 
Recall  that  in Theorem  5 we extended  the  payoff  function  ui from  the  aggregate 
strategy  space  A,  x ... xA,  of  the  original  game  to  the  aggregate  strategy  space 
T(A,)  x -1. x T(A,)  of  an extended  game.  Each  T(Ai)  is compact  and  Hausdorff  in 
the  Vietoris  topology,  and  the  extension  Di  of  Ui is continuous  in this  topology.  To 
do  the  same  thing  on  cpos,  we  need  the  counterpart  of  the  Vietoris  topology  on 
cpos:  this  is the  Lawson  topology. 
Definition  27.  If  L  is a cpo  and  x  is in L,  then  lx=  { y E L  :  xc y} is the  set  of  all 
the  properties  that  refine  x. 
Definition  28.  The  Lawson  topology  on  a  cpo  L  is generated  by  a  sub-basis  con- 
sisting  of  the  Scott-open  sets  and  the  sets  of  the  form  L\  TX, x  in L. 
Examples. 
If  L=  [0, ilk,  the  Lawson  and  the  usual  metric  topology  are  identical.  If 
L = T(S),  where  S is compact  Hausdorff,  the  Lawson  and  the  Vietoris  topologies 
are  identical. 
Theorem  20.  If  L  is a finitely  continuous  cpo,  its  Lawson  topology  is  compact 
Hausdorff  and  has a countable  base. 
Proof.  Lawson  (1989,  pp.  152-154);  for  the  countable  base,  see  Gierz  (1980, 
p.  170). 
Our  ultimate  objective  in the  rest  of  this section  is to show  that  Lawson-open  sets 
are measurable  in the o-algebra  generated  by Scott-open  sets.  To this end,  we define 
continuous  cpos  and  continuous  lattices. 
Definition  29.  Let  A  be  a cpo,  x,  y  elements  of  A:  x is way  below  y,  x~y,  if  for 
any  directed  subset  D of A,  y c U D implies  XC d for  some d in D:  any pairwise  con- 
sistent  collection  D of  properties  that  implies  y  contains  a property  that  implies  x. 
Examples. 
If A  = (0,  11, xey  iff  x<y  in the  usual  order.  If A  =T(S),  where  S is a compact 
Hausdorff  space,  then  for  K, L  in A,  K<L  iff  L c int(K). 
Definition  30.  A  cpo  A  is continuous  if  for  any  y E A: 
(a)  {x E A  : x@y}  is directed. 
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In  words,  every  element  of  A  can  be  approximated  by  the  elements  way  below  it. 
Examples. 
Compact  real  intervals  [a, b],  --oo <a  & b < 03 are continuous  cpos.  T(S)  is a con- 
tinuous  cpo  for  every  compact  Hausdorff  space S;  see Gierz  (1980, p. 284); Lawson 
(1989,  p. 138). 
Definition  31.  A continuous  cpo A is countably  based if there  is a countable  subset 
B  of  A  such  that  for  any  element  y  of  A 
(a)  (XE B : x&y}  is directed. 
(b)  y=U{x~B:xey). 
Theorem  21.  Finitely  continuous  cpos  are countably  based  continuous  cpos. 
Proof.  Gunther  (1989),  Theorem  22 and  the  preceding  discussion. 
Theorem  22.  If L is a finitely  continuous  cpo,  every Lawson-open  set is measurable 
with  respect  to  the  Bore/  o-algebra  determined  by  the  Scott  topology. 
. 
Proof.  It suffices  to  show  that  the  sub-basic  elements  of  the  Lawson  topology  are 
Bore1 measurable  (with respect  to the  Scott  topology).  The  Scott-open  sets certainly 
are.  The  sets of the form  L\  TX also are (recall  that  TX= { y E L : xc  y}.  To  see this, 
let  lx=  {YE L : xey}.  Sets  of  this  form  are  Scott-open  (Lawson,  1989, p.  145). In 
addition,  if  B  is  a  countable  basis  of  L,  then  L\fx=U{L\fb:bdx,  beB}. 
Hence,  L\  TX is measurable,  as a  countable  union  of  Scott-closed  sets.  0 
Corollary.  If  L  is  a finitely  continuous  cpo,  PEA(L)  (see  Definition  24),  and 
u : L --t R*  is Lawson  continuous,  then  the  integral  jL u dp  exists. 
Proof.  Rudin  (1974,  p. 20,  Definition  1.23). 
We  are  finally  ready  for  the  construction  of  universal  games.  We  conclude  this 
section  with  a  crucial  result  of  Gierz  (1980,  Theorem  4.7,  p. 129). 
Theorem  23.  If  X  is a compact  space  and L  a continuous  lattice  endowed  with  the 
Scott  topology,  the set  [X, L]  of  continuous  functions  from  X  to L  ordered  point- 
wise is a continuous  lattice.  In particular,  this holds  when L is the unit  interval  [0,  11. 
4.  Universal  games 
Motivation  for  the  constructions  in this  section  was provided  in Section  2 and  in 
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4.1.  The  category  G of  games 
Let  Z= [-1,  l]  be  endowed  with  its  natural  order,  and  the  Scott  topology. 
Definition  32.  A  game  g = (A, u)  is  an  n-tuple  A = (A,,  . . . ,A,)  of  finitely  con- 
tinuous  posets  and  an  n-tuple  u = (u,,  . . . , 24,) of  Scott-continuous  payoff  functions 
uj : n  (A)  +  z. 
Definition  33.  A  morphism  L : g-r  g’  of  games  is  an  n-tuple  A  = (Ar, . . . , An)  of 
embeddings  Ai: Ai-+Aj  such  that,  for  all  i,  uio n  (A*) <uf  and  u;=  u,!o n  (A) (see 
Fig. 9). 
In  words,  I  embeds  the  strategy  spaces  of  g into  those  of  g’ in  such  a way  that 
ui is a restriction  of  Us!  and  if a’E  n  (A’),  the  payoff  ui(n  @*)(a’))  associated  with 
the  approximation  n  @*)(a’)  of  a’ in g is smaller  than  the  payoff  ui(a’)  associated 
with  a’ itself  in g’. Note  that  there  might  be no morphisms  between  two  given  games 
g and  g’. 
To  see  how  colimits  are  formed  in  G,  let  T:  w -+ G  be  a  functor,  denote 
T(t)=(A’,u’)  and  T(t+t+l)=f’,‘+‘,  Vtew.  Let  g=(A,u)  be  a  game,  and 
A = (1,  : t E co) a natural  transformation  from  the  functor  A’ + A2 +  A3 +  . . . to  the 
constant  functor  KA : co  +  fcpon. 
Theorem  24.  (g,A)  is a colimit  of  T iff 
(a)  (A, A) is a colimit  of  the functor  A1 --f A2 + A3.. . ; 
(b)  Ui= U uf  n  (AJ”), Vi=  1, . . . . n. 
Proof.  First,  note  that  each  Ui is Scott-continuous  by  Theorem  8.  Secondly,  the 
colimit  in  (a)  exists,  by  Theorem  14. Thirdly  A2,  : T(t)  +  g is a morphism  of  games 
because  for  all  i,  n  (AT)uf c Ui and  of=  UiO  fl (Ai). The  rest  comes  from  Coquand, 
Gunther  and  Winskel  (1989,  p. 137). 
Corollary.  G  has  all w  colimits. 
WA’) 
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Fig.  10.  Extension  property. 
4.2.  Extensions  of preferences  on probabilities 
Recall  that  the  constructions  in  the  Introduction  required  that  agents  have 
preferences  over  lotteries  that  extend  their  preferences  on outcomes.  To  describe  this 
extension,  let X be a finitely  continuous  cpo  and  u : X-,  Z a Scott-continuous  func- 
tion.  An  extension  of  u to  d(X)  is a Scott-continuous  r,(u)  : d(X)  +  Z that  makes 
Fig.  10 commute,  where  E assigns to  each x in X the  probability  E(X) with  unit  mass 
on  x;  such  an  extension  is given  by  expected  utility:  r,(u)(p)  = 1 u dp,  p ELI(X). 
This  particular  extension  enjoys  two  properties  that  we want  T to  inherit. 
Definition  34.  T  = (t,  : X  in  fcpo)  is a collection  of  morphisms  with  the  following 
properties: 
(a)  for  each  X,  r,:  [X,Z] --t [d(X),Z]  is Scott-continuous; 
(b)  for  each  u E [X, I],  for  each  X,  r,(u)  OE,  = U; 
(c)  for  each  measurable  f:  Y-+X  and  UE[X,Z],  7,(~4)o~l(f)=t,,(z40f),  i.e. 
Fig.  11 commutes. 
Note  that  if  rw is  expected  utility,  property  (a)  is  Lebesgue’s  monotone  con- 
vergence  theorem  and  property  (c) is the  change  of  variable  formula  in  p. 163 of 
Fig.  11.  Change  of  variable  property. 198  S.  Vassilakis  /  Economic  applications  of  Scott  domains 
Holmos  (1950).  To  see  this,  note  that  (c),  in  the  case  of  expected  utility,  reduces  to, 
for  all  qcd(Y), 
i 
u d(qof-‘)  = 
x  s 
&of)  dq 
Y 
(see Definition  26  for  d(f)). 
4.3.  The  game  constructor  F:  G +  G 
We  now  define  precisely  the  game  constructor  F  that  first  appeared  in  the  In- 
troduction. 
Definition  35.  The  functor  Ri:  fcpoi  +  fcpoE  is  defined 
(i)  on  objects  by  R,(A)  = A JJ (A)  X  [A;  4  Ai], 
(ii)  on  morphisms  by  R,(A)  =A JJ (A) X (AiO -  OAR), 
where  A : A  -+ A’. 
Definition  36.  The  functor  R : fcpok-+  fcpog  is  defined  by 
R(A)=(R,(A),  . ...&(A)), 
R(~)=(R,(IZ),...,R,(L)). 
Theorem  25.  R preserves  w  colimits. 
Proof.  By  Theorems  12,  13 and  17,  the  functors  A,  +  , X  preserve  o  colimits;  R 
is  a  composite  of  these  functors. 
R  will  define  F  on  objects;  to  define  F  on  morphisms  we  will  need  to  compute 
the  probability  in  A fl  (A)  induced  by  a  vector  of  strategies  (p, 6)  in  n  R(A).  By 
Definitions  32  and  35,p=(p,  ,...,  p,),  a=(61  ,...,  6,),pi~dn(A),  6i:A~~Ai.  Let 
Pije  A(aj)  be  the  marginal  of  Pi in  Aj;  the  product  measure  P~jx  ...  x P,,j in  d(Ay) 
indicates  the  probability  with  which  agent  j  will  receive  recommendations  on  what 
to  do  from  each  of  the  n  players;  these  recommendations  are  then  fed  into  j’s  devia- 
tion  function  Sj:  A;  +Aj  to  produce  j’s  action.  Hence,  the  probability  measure 
ti(P9~)=(pljx  ...  x Pnj)oa,”  in  d(Aj)  computes  the  probability  of  each  property 
of  the  actions  open  to  agent  j,  given  that  (p,6)  is  played.  Hence,  the  product 
measure 
<A(P,  6) = II  rA:‘(p,  6) 
is  the  probability  measure  on  the  aggregate  strategy  space  n  (A)  induced  by  (p, 6). 
It  is  easy  to  show  that  for  each  A,  &  : Jj R(A)  -+  A n  (A)  is  Scott-continuous  and 
that  < : n  R + A n  is  a  natural  transformation. 
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An(A) 
Fig.  12.  Definition  of  game  constructor. 
game  F(g)  = (R(A),  v),  where  v  is  defined  by  Fig.  12,  Vi.  Also,  F  assigns  to  each 
morphism  I  : g +  g’ in  G  the  morphism  F(A) = R(A). 
It  can  be  shown  that  F(I)  is  a  morphism  in  G  (Vassilakis,  1990,  p.  33),  and  that 
the  following  holds  (pp.  34-38). 
Theorem  26.  F preserves  o  colimits. 
This  is  one  of  the  two  crucial  theorems  that  will  allow  us  to  apply  Theorem  2 on 
the  existence  of  fixed  points.  The  next  result  is  the  other  crucial  ingredient. 
Theorem  27.  For  each  game  g,  there  is  an  embedding  pg : g -+  F(g).  Moreover, 
v, : Id  +  F  is a natural  transformation  (Id  : G--f  G  is the  identity  functor). 
Proof.  If  g=  (A, u),  then  for  each  i,  9:: Ai -R,(A)  is  defined  by  ~~(ai)=(I,a~), 
where  I  Ed  fl A  is  the  probability  measure  that  assigns  unit  mass  to  the  least  ele- 
ment  of  n  (A)  and  a;: Al--t  Ai  is  the  constant  function  at  ai.  The  rest  is  in 
Vassilakis  (1990,  p.  39).  0 
Theorem  28.  For each game g, there is a universal  game X(g),  unique  up to isomor- 
phism,  defined  as  the  colimit  of  the functor  of  iterations  of  F  with  respect  to 
p’s  : g + F(g)  (see Definition  10);  X(g)  is then  a fixed  point  of  F  (Theorem  2). 
X  can  be  extended  to  morphisms  ,U  : g -+ g’ as  well  (Vassilakis,  1990,  p. 40).  The 
resulting  functor,  X:  G -+ G,  satisfies  the  following  theorem. 
Theorem  29.  X  preserves  o  colimits. 
Proof.  Lehmann  and  Smyth  (1981,  p.  119,  Theorem  4.1). 
This  theorem  is useful  when  the  universal  game  constructor  X  is used  as  an  ingre- 
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5.  The  category  Z  of  solution  concepts 
5.1.  Motivation 
A  solution  concept  is an  operation  that  assigns  to  each  game  a property  of  its  ag- 
gregate  strategy  vectors.  For  example,  the  Nash  solution  concept  is  defined  by  the 
following  operation:  ‘For  each  game  g,  find  the  set  of  fixed  points  of  its  best-reply 
correspondence.’  There  are  two  points  worth  abstracting  from  this  example.  First, 
to  perform  the  operation,  we  always  apply  the  same  rule  on  each  game.  Secondly, 
from  each  player’s  point  of  view,  a  solution  concept  predicts  the  behavior  of  the 
other  players  in  each  game;  in  other  words,  it  is  a  theory  about  the  behavior  of 
others.  If  this  view  is  accepted,  each  player  must  be  allowed  to  choose  his  or  her 
own  theory;  it  follows  that,  in  principle,  two  different  players  might  choose  two  dif- 
ferent  theories  about  the  behavior  of  a third  player;  it  is well  known  that  this  is  not 
allowed  by  the  Nash  solution  concept  and  its  refinement.  More  importantly,  we  now 
have  to  model  the  choice  of  theories  by  agents.  On  the  one  hand,  this  sounds  very 
attractive  because  it  might  lead  to  the  development  of  new  solution  concepts.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  generates  modelling  problems  at  least  as  difficult  as  those 
generated  by  infinite  regress.  For  example,  solution  concepts  have  to  be  defined 
abstractly;  the  definition  has  to  capture  the  fact  that  solution  concepts  are  opera- 
tions  that  prescribe  the  same  rule  in  each  game;  the  ‘space’  of  solution  concepts  has 
to  have  the  kind  of  properties,  say  compactness,  that  we  usually  need  when  we 
model  choice  of  a point  from  a space  of  points.  But  the  ‘space’  of  solution  concepts 
might  be  too  large  to  even  be  a  set,  let  alone  a  compact  set,  given  that  the  category 
of  games  is  too  large  to  be  a  set. 
It  turns  out  that  similar  problems  were  faced  by  computer  scientists  trying  to 
model  abstractly  ‘polymorphic  operations’.  The  following  example  clarifies  the 
meaning  of  such  operations,  draws  an  analogy  between  them  and  solution  concepts, 
and  motivates  their  abstract  definition. 
Example. 
Consider  the  operation:  ‘for  each  cpo  X,  and  for  each  Scott-continuousf:  X+  X, 
assign  to  f  its  least  fixed  point’. 
Intuitively,  this  is  a  polymorphic  operation  because  for  each  X  and  f  we  apply 
the  same  rule  to  perform  the  operation,  namely  the  rule  m,(f)  = U,“=  , f”(_~), 
where  I  is the  least  element  of  X,  and  m,(f)  is the  least  fixed  point  off.  To  represent 
the  operation  abstractly,  note  that  m,  belongs  to  the  cpo  H(X)  = [[X-X]  -+X1. 
A  pair  (X, k),  k  E H(X),  is a fibration  of  (the  functor)  H.  Let  Fib(H)  be  the  category 
of  fibrations  of  H.  Then  the  operation  ‘take  the  least  fixed  point’  can  be  abstractly 
represented  by  a continuous  fun&or  0 : cpoE +  Fib(H),  where  a(X)  = (X, m,).  Such 
a  functor  is called  a (continuous)  section  of  H.  The  fact  that  performing  the  opera- 
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fact  that  o  is both  continuous  and  a  functor  (the  appropriate  diagrams  commute). 
For  more  information,  see Section  5.3  and  Coquand,  Gunter  and  Winskel  (1989). 
By analogy,  then,  we will model  solution  concepts  as continuous  sections  of  the 
functor  d fl PR,  , that  assigns to  each  game g = (A, U) the  cpo  d fl (A) of  probabili- 
ty  measures  on  its  aggregate  strategy  space.  This  definition  has  an  unexpected 
bonus:  the  ‘space’  Z  of  all  solution  concepts  is (equivalent  to)  a cpo.  To  see why 
this is so,  recall  that  the  strategy  spaces  of  each  game  are  finitely  continuous  posets 
(Definition  22).  A characterization  theorem  cited  in Graham  (1988,  p. 221) and  in 
Gunter  (1989,  ch. 22) shows  that  X  is finitely  continuous  if  and  only  if X  is either 
a  finite  pose&  or  an  0  colimit  in cpon  of  finite  posets,  or  a  project  of  such  a co- 
limit  (X  is  a  project  of  D  if  there  is an  embedding-projection  pair  (f,f*),  with 
f:  X-+  D  and f  * : D +  X;  then,  given  that  f  * is onto,  X=f*(D)).  The  same  result 
holds  for  games  (Section  5.1).  Hence,  if we assume  that  a solution  concept,  in addi- 
tion  to preserving  o  colimits,  also preserves  projects,  we conclude  that  each  solution 
concept  is completely  determined  by  its values  on  finite  games.  The  collection  of 
finite  games,  though,  is a set (by  identifying  isomorphic  games);  hence,  the  collec- 
tion  of all possible  solution  concepts  on  finite  games  is a set,  and  therefore  so is the 
collection  of  all  solution  concepts.  This  is basically  the  argument  in  Section  5.4. 
Modelling  already  existing  solution  concepts  in the way sketched  here is still an open 
problem,  for  reasons  discussed  in  Sections  6 and  7. 
5.2.  Obtaining  games  as projects  of  profinite  games 
Motivated  by  the  discussion  in  Section  5.1,  we  can  now  make  precise  the  sense 
in  which  infinite  games  can  be  obtained  by  operations  on  finite  games. 
Definition  38.  A cpo X is a project  of  a cpo  D if there  is an embedding-projection 
pair  f  :X+D,  f*:D-+X. 
Definition  39.  A  cpo  D  is profinite  if  it  is an  w  colimit  in cpo,  of  finite  cpos. 
Theorem  30.  A  cpo X  is finitely  continuous  if  and  only  if  it is a project  of  a pro- 
finite. 
Proof.  Gunter  (1989,  Theorem  22). 
We  now  give  a  characterization  of  profinites  that  will  be  used  when  we define 
solution  concepts. 
Definition  40.  Let  D  be  a  cpo.  A  finitary  projection  p : D + D  of  D  is a  Scott- 
continuous  map  with  finite  range  that  satisfies  p2 =p < id,.  Let  M(D)  be the  set of 
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Theorem  31.  A  cpo  D  is profinite  if and  only  if M(D)  is countable,  directed,  and 
u  M(D)  = idD  ( recall  that  U  denotes  least  upper  bound). 
Proof.  Gunter  (1985,  p.47). 
We  can  now  extend  Theorems  30  and  31  to  games. 
Definition  41.  A  game  g = (A,  u)  is  a  project  of  a  game  g’ = (A’, u’> if 
(a)  each  Ai  is  a  project  of  A:,  i.e.  there  are  embedding-projection  pairs 
J;-:A-+Ai,f;:*:Ai+A,  for  all  i; 
(b)  u,!=u;o  n  (f  *),  for  all  i. 
Definition  42.  A  game  is  profinite  if  it  is the  w  colimit  in  GE  of  (a  chain  of)  finite 
games. 
Theorem  32.  Zf g is a game  in  the  category  GE,  then  g is either 
(a)  finite;  or 
(b)  profinite;  or 
(c)  a project  of profinite. 
Proof.  Let  g = (A,  u).  By  Theorem  30,  each  Ai  is either  finite,  profinite  or  a project 
of  a  profinite.  If  all  Ai  are  finite,  we  are  in  case  (a).  If  all  Ai  are  profinite,  then 
there  are  finite  cpos  A,(t)  such  that  Ai=colimit,  A;(t).  Let  ui(t)  =restriction  of  Ui 
on  ny=‘=, Ai(  and  let  g(t)=  (A(t),  u(t)>.  Then  g=colimit,  g(t),  and  we  are  in  case 
(b).  Finally,  if  all  Ai  are  projects  of  profinites  AI,  these  are  embeddings&  : Ai --f A:. 
Let  u,! = Uio n  (f*)  and  g’=  (A’, u’).  Then  g  is  a  project  of  the  profinite  g’. 
Finally,  we  define  for  future  reference  a  more  ‘symmetric’  relation  between 
games. 
Definition  43.  Two  games  g  and  g’ are  adjoint  if  there  are  Scott-continuous  func- 
tions  A : A  + A’  and  p  : A’ + A  such  that 
(a)  piOli<idA,,  Aiop<id,:; 
(b)  uI=u~O  n  (~),  Ui=UIo  n  (~). 
Note  that  I  uniquely  determines  P,  and  vice  versa. 
5.3.  Fibrations  and  sections 
Motivated  by  the  discussion  in  Section  5.1,  we  define  solution  concepts  as  con- 
tinuous,  adjoint-preserving  sections  of  the  functor  H=d  fl  PR,,  that  assigns  to 
each  game  g = (A,  u)  the  cpo  H(g)  = d  n  (A)  of  probability  measures  on  its  ag- 
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Definition  44.  The  category  of  fibrations  (Fib(H)),  of  the  functor  N:  G--t  fcpo, 
has 
objects:  all  pairs  (g,p),  p~H(g); 
morphisms:  A : (g,p)  -+ (g’,p’)  iff  A : g +  g’ is  a  morphism  in  G  and  H(A)(p)  up’. 
Definition  45.  A  section  of  H  is  a  functor  o  : G--t  Fib(H)  such  that 
(a)  o(g)=(g,p,),  for  all  g  in  G; 
(b)  o(A)  = 1,  for  all  morphisms  ,l  in  G. 
For  the  purpose  of  the  next  definition,  if  o is a section  of  H,  we write  a(g)  = (g,p), 
dg’)  = (g’v  P’). 
Definition  46.  A  section  c  of  H  preserves  adjoints  if,  whenever  @,p)  : g +  g’ is  an 
adjunction,  then  p = H(p)(p’),  p‘= H(A)(p).  It  is  easy  to  see  that  if  g  and  g’ have 
unique  Nash  equilibria  and  are  adjoint,  then  these  Nash  equilibria  satisfy  the  re- 
quirements  of  Definition  46, 
Definition  47.  A  solution  concept  is  a  section  of  H  that  preserves  adjoints  and 
countable  directed  colimits. 
Definition  48.  A  morphism  of  solution  concepts  is  a  natural  transformation 
u : (T  -+ 0’  such  that  for  all  games  g,  o(g)  = id,. 
Unpacking  the  content  of  this  definition,  we  can  show  that  u : CT  -+ CT’  if  and  only 
for  each  game  g, p up’,  where  a(g)  = (g,p),  a’(g)  = (g,p’).  Hence,  the  category  .X of 
solution  concepts  is  a  (possibly  large)  partial  order.  The  next  section  shows  that  J5 
is  in  fact  small,  i.e.  equivalent  to  a  cpo. 
5.4.  Zisacpo 
Motivated  by  the  discussion  in  Section  5.1,  we can  now  sketch  the  argument  that 
shows  that  JC is  a  cpo. 
Let  FG  be  the  subcategory  of  G  consisting  of  finite  games  and  all  morphisms  be- 
tween  them.  Each  strategy  space  of  a  game  in  FG  can  be  identified  with  a  finite 
subset  of  o;  the  number  of  partial  orders  on  each  subspace  is  also  finite:  hence  the 
set  of  all  such  strategy  spaces  A  is countable.  On  the  one  hand,  for  each  A,  the  set 
of  all  payoff  functions  on  n  (A)  has  cardinality  equal  to  I.  On  the  other  hand,  for 
each  of  two  finite  games  g  and  g’,  there  are  finitely  many  morphisms  from  g  to  g’, 
and  therefore  the  collection  of  all  such  morphisms  has  cardinality  equal  to  I.  This 
argument  shows  that  the  category  FG  is equivalent  to  a small  subcategory  S of  FG, 
where  in  S  all  games  have  finite  subsets  of  ICY as  strategy  spaces.  The  category  zs 
of  solution  concepts  on  S  is  also  small,  because  the  set  of  all  possible  probability 
measures  on  each  game  in  g  is  a  subset  of  some  finite  dimensional  space,  and  S  is 
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Theorem  33.  Z  is equivalent  to  Zs,, and Zs is a cpo. 
Proof.  We  define  two  functors,  res : Z-+  Es and  ext : _Z5  -+ Z,  and  show  that  they 
form  an equivalence  of categories.  First,  res(a)  is simply  CT  restricted  on S. Secondly, 
ext(a)  is defined  as  follows: 
0  If  g is in  S,  ext(a)(g)  = a(g). 
l  If  g  is  a  profinite,  then  by  Theorem  31  each  M(Ai)  is  countable,  directed 
and  idA,  = UM(Ai).  For  each  n-tuple  f  in  M(A,)  x  .a. xM(An),  let  gf= 
(f(4&,+  E ac h  gf  is  finite.  Let  a(gf)  = (fr,  P’),  and  let p = Uf  H(A~)(P~), 
where  $:  gf -+ g embeds  each  gf into  g.  Then  define  ext(o)(g)  = (g,p). 
l  If (A,  ,D)  : g--r g’ is an adjunction  and  if ext(o)(g’)  = (g’,p’),  then  define  ext(a)(g)  = 
(g,H(p)(@)).  One  can  show,  by  mimicking  the  arguments  in  Coquand  et  al. 
(1989), that  these  definitions  make  sense,  and  that  ext and  res are  ‘inverse’  to each 
other,  i.e. 
res ext(a)  = 0,  o E &, 
ext res(a)  = 0,  0 E Z; 
and  that  .Es is a  cpo. 
It is not  known  yet  whether  &  is a finitely  continuous  cpo.  We can  now  use  our 
knowledge  about  Z  to  solve  equations  whose  variables  are  solution  concepts. 
6.  Coordination-proof  solution  concepts 
This  section  outlines  one  possible  way to impose  restrictions  on solution  concepts, 
namely  that  the  prediction  of  a  solution  concept  o  on  each  game  g should  be  im- 
mune  to successful  attempts  to coordinate  on g, where  success  is also defined  by the 
solution  concept  cr. The  prediction  of  IS on  the  universal  game  X(g)  generated  by 
g,  call  it  q = pr,o(X(g)),  defines  (stochastically)  the  successful  attempts  to  coor- 
dinate  on g.  When  q is projected  back  on g,  it yields  a probability  measure  y(g)(q) 
that  is interpreted  as the  (stochastic)  actions  undertaken  in g as a result  of  (in com- 
pliance  with)  the  successful  attempts  to  coordinate  on  g.  Given  that  these  attempts 
are  successful,  the  actions  in g will be  y(g)(q);  but  the  actions  in g are  predicted  by 
a(g).  Hence,  it  should  be  true  that  for  all g 
or 
o(g)  = (g, y(g)(q)) 
or 
o(g)  = (g, y(g)(prAX(g)))  = V(o)(g) 
d = w(a). 
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of the  functor  v/. Vassilakis  (1990, p. 57) shows that  w preserves  o  colimits  and  that 
for  each  solution  concept  Q there  is a solution  concept  8=  v/(B) obtained  as the  co- 
limit  of  the  functor  o--,  u/(o)+  ~~(a)--+  . . . .  B is the  coordination-proof  solution 
concept  generated  by  o.  It  can  be  computed  pointwise  by 
6(g)=  fi  WWW. 
t=o 
Unfortunately,  we cannot  take  o  to  be the  Nash  solution  concept:  even  if g has  a 
unique  Nash  equilibrium,  X(g)  will in general  have  multiple  Nash  equilibria,  while 
we restrict  0 to  be single-valued.  The  extension  of  this  construction  to  multivalued 
solution  concepts  is still  an  open  problem. 
7.  Open  problems 
This  section  briefly  indicates  how  one  would  build  on  the  results  and  techniques 
in  the  main  body  of  this  paper. 
7. I.  Solution  concepts 
The  main  open  problem  of  this  research  is the  construction  of  solution  concepts 
that  are  coordination-proof  (Section  6);  are  determined  by  their  values  on  finite 
games  (Section  5); are allowed  to be multivalued  (as is Nash);  are based  on mutually 
consistent  optimization  (as  is  Nash);  and  are  computable.  The  results  of  Lewis 
(1991) suggest  that  such  solution  concepts  will sometimes  have  to  sacrifice  full  op- 
timization  to  attain  computability.  The  objective  of  the  construction  of  such  solu- 
tion  concepts  is to  take  the  first  steps  towards  a theory  of  equilibrium  institutions. 
7.2.  Equilibrium  institutions 
Recall  that  for  each  game  g,  a universal  game  X(g)  is a colimit  of  the  functor  of 
iterations  g + F(g)  -+ F2(g)  +  .  Let  A  = (A,:F’(g)  +  X()>  be  a  colimit  natural 
transformation.  Then,  by the  basic  lemma  on  p. 765 of  Smyth  and  Plotkin  (1982), 
there  is a unique  f:  X(g)  +&Y(g))  that  makes  Fig.  13 diagram  commute  for  all  t 
F  (g) 
h, 
)  X(g) 
KW) 
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(and  f  is an  isomorphism).  This  fact  implies  that  if  a  solution  concept  predicts  p  on 
X(g),  it  predictsp’=d  n  PR,(f)(p)  on  F(X(g)).  By  the  definition  of  F, p/contains 
a  prediction  about  the  kind  of  institutions  that  prevail  in  an  environment  described 
by  g;  their  characterization,  even  for  the  simplest  games,  is  an  open  problem. 
7.3.  More  restrictions  on  solution  concepts 
The  construction  sketched  below  owes  a  lot  to  the  ideas  in  the  cheap-talk 
literature,  and  assumes  that  2  is  (equivalent  to)  a  finitely  continuous  poset  (see  the 
conclusion  of  section  6).  A  solution  concept  o  in  2  is  now  interpreted  as  a  theory 
of  agent  i, predicting  a property  of  the  outcome  of  each  game  g:  the  idea  borrowed 
from  the  cheap-talk  literature  is that  theory  (si should  be  immune  to  revisions  caused 
by  communication  with  other  agents  where  the  method  is  utilized  to  revise  his 
theory,  and  the  messages  communicated  by  other  agents  are  those  predicted  by  oi 
itself.  One  way  to  formalize  this  is to  assume  that  agents  propose  solution  concepts 
to  each  other  (‘this  is  how  I  will  play’;  ‘this  is  how  I  think  others  will  play’).  For 
each  game  g = (A, U) define  a  new  game  H(g)  = (B, u),  where  Bj = Z  x  [C” -+ Z]  and 
Lii  : n  (B) +  I.  Each  agent  i proposes  a  solution  concept  oi  in  Z,  and  adopts  a  devia- 
tion  strategy  6;:  .Z”-+  Z  that  maps  each  n-tuple  of  proposed  solution  concepts 
B = (ai.  . . a,)  to  the  solution  concept  a’(8)  adopted  by  agent  i.  Each  vector  (8,6) 
in  n  (B)  induces  a  probability  measure  p EA  n  (A),  defined  by  p=pl  x  1.. xp,, 
where  pi  is  the  marginal  on  Ai  of  6,(6)(g);  the  payoff  ui(s,ds)  associated  with  a 
strategy  (~?,a)  in  H(g)  is  equal  to  the  payoff  am,  associated  with  p  in  the 
original  game  g.  Finally,  define  a  functor  Qi : Z-+  2  for  each  i that  assigns  to  each 
solution  concept  cr; E 2  a  solution  concept  Qi(o;);  Q;(oi)(g)  = prio;(H(g))  = the 
solution  concept  adopted  by  i in  the  game  H(g),  as  predicted  by  Di.  We  say  that 
oi  is  communication-proof  if  CJ~  = Qi(ai);  the  existence  of  such  fixed  points  is  an 
open  problem. 
7.4.  Working  in simpler  categories 
Finitely  continuous  posets  are  not  easy  to  work  with,  because  (a)  they  lack  an  in- 
trinsic  characterization  in  terms  of  properties  of  their  order  relation,  and  (b)  they 
are  not  complete  lattices.  Finitely  continuous  posets  that  are  also  complete  lattices, 
though,  are  exactly  the  continuous  lattices  (with  a countable  base).  The  category  of 
continuous  lattices  and  embeddings  has  all  the  properties  needed  for  the  construc- 
tions  (see  Gierz,  1980)  except  one:  if L is a continuous  lattice,  d(L)  is not  necessarily 
a  continuous  lattice.  A  standard  way  of  resolving  such  problems  is  by  completion, 
i.e.  by  ‘adding  elements’  to  d(L)  until  it  becomes  a  continuous  lattice  A(L).  Such 
completions  have  been  studied  in  different  contexts  (i.e.  not  in  the  case  of  the  prob- 
ability  functor):  see  Hrbacek  (1987,  1989).  The  construction  of  a  completion  d(L) 
of  d(L)  with  the  following  properties  is  an  open  problem: 
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(b)  there  is an  extension  operation  r,  : [L, I] --$  [d(L), I]  with  the  continuity  and 
naturality  properties  described  in  Section  4.2; 
(c)  d(L)  is the  minimal  completion  of  d(L)  that  satisfies  (a)  and  (b); 
(d)  the  elements  in d”(L) \d(L)  are  economically  meaningful. 
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